We apply insights from the heterogeneous firms' literature to an empirical investigation of wage inequality in China, focusing on the potential influences of FDI and trade. Using firmlevel data, we examine intra-sectoral wage inequality in a major industrial region with firms identified according to five firm ownership types and three exporter status types. We find large ownership-type wage premiums separate from other observable influences on wages, including a firm's exporter status. Our results indicate that ownership type matters more than exporter status as a determinant in explaining intra-sectoral wage inequality in China's Yangtze River Delta. We also find evidence of asymmetric wage effects of firm type by exporter status and by other wage determinants.
1. Introduction
China's rapid economic growth has been accompanied by increasing concern over the income disparities that have accompanied this growth. The Research Report of China Household Finance Survey 2012 estimated China's 2010 Gini coefficient at 0.61, much higher than the 0.44 international average for that year and much higher than the 0.41 for China in 2000, the last year the Chinese government announced a Gini coefficient. Income inequality may involve income gaps across regions, industries, occupations, skill groups and/or firms. Since many of these types of inequality have been found to be persistent and growing in China, 2 economists and policymakers want to understand the influences that exacerbate or mitigate these patterns. Attention often is focused on international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as contributing influences since China has become the top exporting country and the top recipient of FDI worldwide.
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Economists have studied the linkages between trade and incomes for many years, 4 but the theoretical framework for much of this past work has been the Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific
Factors Models which predict changes in relative wages across skill groups, occupations and sectors. These models provide no guidance in understanding recent empirical results showing increased wage inequality in both developed and developing countries, increased wage dispersion across firms within the same industry and increased residual wage dispersion among workers with similar observed characteristics. Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding (2012) propose that more recent models of international trade that incorporate heterogeneous firms can 2 provide explanations for all of these empirical findings. They develop a model in which heterogeneous firms in an industry pay heterogeneous wages based on differences in productivities, costs to screen workers, and fixed costs to export. They build their model to explain trends they find in Brazilian firm-level data.
We propose that a heterogeneous firms framework also should be applied to examine wage inequality in China and to understand the potential influences of FDI and trade. Using firm-level data we focus on wage dispersion across firms in the same industry. We seek to determine to what extent firm-level wage differentials can be attributed to well-known determinants, such as differences in worker skills or capital-labor ratios, versus newer determinants such as a firm's size, exporter status, or ownership type. 5 In particular, we seek to identify an ownership-type wage premium separate from other observable influences on wages.
Our results for two large industries in a major industrial region in China suggest that ownership type matters more than exporter status as a determinant in explaining intra-sectoral wage inequality in China.
Our inquiry relates to a long line of research that has identified a foreign ownership wage premium and to more recent research identifying an exporter wage premium. Our study's advantages over previous studies are: 1) our ability to disentangle different influences on wages, unlike previous studies where FDI wage premiums were typically identified while ignoring exporter wage premiums, and vice versus; 2) our use of firm-level data for a transition economy, which allows us to compare foreign-owned firms with three different types of domestic firmsChina's state-owned firms, collectives and private firms; 3) our data's unique inclusion of two different types of foreign investors (so-called foreign investors versus overseas Chinese investors located in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan); and 4) we are the first to examine exporter wage premiums across two different types of exporters existing in China-regular exporters and pure exporters. Defever and Riano (2012) document the policy incentives in China that create a distinct subset of firms that they call "pure exporters", defined as firms that export almost all (i.e., over 90%) of their output. These firms enjoy preferential tax treatment (i.e., pure exporter subsidies) compared with regular exporters and with non-exporters. They find that pure exporters tend to be more productive than non-exporters but less productive than regular exporters. They focus on the aggregate welfare effects of the pure exporter subsidies whereas we focus on the wage effects relative to regular exporters and non-exporters.
Our study follows in the tradition of Jensen (1995, 1997) who identified firm-level differences in wages and employment between U.S. firms that export and those that do not. To capture some of these observations, the basic models of international trade with firm heterogeneity allow firms within an industry to differ by size, productivity, exporter status and multinational status. Led by Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) , this literature has provided explanations for empirical findings that only some firms within an industry export and these exporters tend to be larger and more productive than non-exporters.
However, these early models did not accommodate the exporter wage premium identified by Jensen (1995, 1997) and later confirmed by others.
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The exporter wage premium that exists even after controlling for differences in firm size, capital-intensity and observable worker characteristics might be due to firms sharing the extra rents earned in export markets with their workers or due to exporters having more able workers than non-exporters. The later hypothesis prompted Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2011) to extend the heterogeneous firms model to include labor market frictions. Their model predicts 4 that larger, more productive firms spend more to screen their workers and thereby exclude those with lower abilities. These larger firms end up with workforces of higher-than-average abilities and they can pay higher wages. Helpman et. al. (2011) are able to generate results that match empirical findings that higher wages are paid by larger firms and by exporters.
7 Helpman, et. al. (2012) use Brazilian data to examine the trend of increasing wage dispersion between firms in the same sector and between workers with similar characteristics.
They find that both between firm and within firm inequality make about equal contributions to wage inequality within sector-occupation groups, but changes over time are almost all due to wage inequality between firms. 8 They also find that even after controlling for size and exporter status, residual wage inequality across firms is large. We propose that different firm ownership types might help to explain residual inter-firm wage inequality, particularly for a transition economy like China.
There are many studies that have looked for a foreign ownership wage premium for countries other than China. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) were among the first to confirm that foreign ownership wage premiums exist even after controlling for region, industry, plant size and worker characteristics. They found that foreign firms paid 12% more for blue-collar workers and 22% more for white-collar workers in Indonesian factories. They suggest numerous possible reasons for these wage premiums: 1) host-country requirements or pressures; 2) workers' preferences for working for a domestic, rather than foreign, employer; 3) foreign firms' stronger aversion to worker turnover due to higher training costs or fear of technology leakage to domestic rivals; and 4) foreign firms' disadvantage relative to domestic firms in identifying high-quality workers without paying wage premiums. More recent studies have gone further than Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) in trying to assess whether foreign firms pay more for similar quality workers by using matched employer-employee data. Using such data for Sweden, Heyman, Sjoholm and Tingvall (2007) find that foreign-owned firms do pay more than domestic-owned firms but that these higher wages can be explained by firm and worker characteristics. Greaney and Li (2012) examined the effects of FDI on China's wages and employment, but the level of analysis was industry-level rather than firm-level. The paper shows that industries that received higher shares of their funding from state, collective or private domestic capital sources tended to pay less, while those receiving larger capital investments from overseas
Chinese capital and FDI capital were associated with higher pay.
Rather than looking for an aggregate foreign ownership wage premium, several papers have investigated FDI's effect on the skilled labor wage premium in China. Zhao (2001) and Wu (2001) both find empirical evidence that FDI contributes to the wage gap between skilled labor and unskilled labor in China, but they propose different hypotheses for this effect. Zhao (2001) argues that labor market distortions in a developing and transition economy like China might force foreign investors to pay a wage premium to attract skilled labor away from the "privileged" state-owned enterprises, but unskilled labor is easy to attract. Wu (2001) attributes the FDI effect on the skilled labor wage premium to better intellectual property rights protection of foreign-invested enterprises. Hale and Long (2011) look for direct and indirect effects of FDI on skilled versus unskilled labor in China. They conclude that FDI firms pay more for skilled labor and the observed quality of that labor is higher than in private domestic firms. For indirect effects, they find that higher FDI in an industry drives up the skilled labor wages in private domestic firms and drives down the quality of skilled workers in SOEs. Chen, Ge and Lai 6 (2011) also look for indirect, or spillover, effects of FDI on wages in domestic firms and find evidence of negative spillovers on wage levels and on wage growth.
In comparison to the separate literature strands on exporter wage premiums and FDI wage premiums, Han, Liu and Zhang (2012) examine the impacts of globalization, broadly defined, on within-region wage inequality in China. They find that China's regions that are more exposed to globalization experienced greater increases in wage inequality compared with lessexposed regions following two major trade liberalization events-Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour in 1992 and China's accession to the WTO in 2001. They find that the mechanism by which trade liberalization caused increased within-region wage inequality was through increased returns to education. In a similar spirit, we seek to determine the impacts of both exporting and FDI on wage inequality in China, but rather than measuring combined effects our goal is to disentangle these effects. Next we provide a description of our data, followed by a discussion of our empirical methodology, and then our results and conclusions.
Data
We use firm-level data from the Financial Information Database for Chinese industrial enterprises provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC we have some degree of input variation across our two industries since the General Equipment
Industry has a higher share of higher educated workers than the national average while the Textiles Industry has a lower share of higher educated workers.
Our first regression analysis follows Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) who examined FDI wage premiums in Indonesia, but we make some modifications to accommodate a broader set of firm types and to examine the influence of exporter status on wages. We seek to estimate the determinants of firm-level wages using robust regression 12 for the following equation:
where w i represents average wage for firm i in a single 2-digit industry located in the YRD.
Control i represents m control variables for firm i that are expected to influence its wages,
FirmType i represents n ownership variables for firm i, Exporter i represents an exporter dummy variable for regular exporters (0 < export share of sales < 0.9), and PureExporter i is a dummy variable for pure exporters (export share of sales > 0.9). City ij is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i is located in city j, and zero otherwise; 13 and Sector ik is an industry dummy equal to one if firm i is in 4-digit industry k within either the GE or Textiles Industries, and equal to zero otherwise. 14 The control variables include the capital-labor ratio (i.e., fixed assets per worker) to control for differing levels of capital-intensity across firms, total employment to control for firm size (i.e., scale economies effects), 15 the share of higher educated workers in the firm's workforce to control for labor quality differences across firms, 16 and the share of female workers in the firm's workforce to account for gender wage differentials. 17 The expected sign on the first three control variables is positive, and on the last variable is negative. Su and Heshmati (2011) find that the average female's wage in China in 2011 was only 82.5% of the average male's wage. In decomposing the source of China's gender wage gap, they conclude that 85% is due to discrimination rather than to individual characteristics (e.g., education, experience, geographic location, occupation). Therefore we expect to find that firms with a larger share of female workers have lower average wages even after controlling for many of the individual characteristics.
The ownership variables for capital supplied by the State, Collectives, Overseas Chinese, or Foreign Direct Investment are expressed in two different ways-1) as dummy variables identifying the legal ownership classification for the firm; and 2) as shares of the total paid-in- 13 We use 15 city dummies for the largest cities in the YRD. 14 We check for multicollinearity across our independent variables and do not find high correlation coefficients. 15 We also tried grouping firms into quintile groups by employment size and using size dummies rather than the log of total employment to allow for non-linear relationships between firm size and the dependent variables, but that did not qualitatively change our results.
capital for the firm. A significant coefficient for any ownership variable indicates a difference for that ownership type relative to the average PDE, which make up the majority of firms in both industries tested.
The inclusion of Exporter and PureExporter dummy variables is prompted by Defever and Riano (2012) who find that China's preferential subsidies offered to pure exporters prompts an odd clustering of firms that export almost all of their output, which is not typically observed in other countries.
18 They find that pure exporters tend to be less productive than regular exporters but more productive than non-exporters. This productivity ranking might produce a wage ranking with regular exporters on top, followed by pure exporters and then non-exporters, but the subsidies received by pure exporters could boost their wages up further. We expect to find positive and significant coefficients for Exporter and PureExporter, but the quantitative ranking of these coefficients is difficult to predict. We also expect that many, if not most, of our City dummy variables will produce positive and significant effects on firm wages due to wellknown urban-rural wage inequality in China. However, we do not present these results since our focus is on identifying wage effects from firm ownership and exporter status, while controlling for other observable differences across firms that might affect wages.
The results from equation (1) prompted us to add interaction effects between our key independent variables to our regression. First, we interact firm type and exporter status to check for asymmetric wage effects across both dimensions. Based on those results, we also interact firm type with control variables and group firms by exporter status to seek explanations for the strong firm type wage premiums we find. To facilitate our interpretation of the estimated coefficients, the control variables are centered around the mean values for PDEs in each exporter 12 status grouping of firms. For consistency across our regression results, the control variables used in equation (1) without interaction terms also are centered around the mean values for PDEs. the trends we investigate in the YRD region also are found at the national level. We observe that only 29% of the firms are exporters or pure exporters, but these firms account for 48% of the labor force, 52% of output and 49% of total assets.
Results

Descriptive Statistics
The lower panel of Table 1 shows firm level averages for our variables of interest. The average firm exports 18% of its sales, but there are large differences in this measure across firm types with the average FDIE or HMTE exporting 47-49% while the average SOE exports only 3% of sales. The likelihood of being an exporter varies even more by firm type, from a low of 10% for SOEs to 67-69% for HMTEs and FDIEs, respectively. Average annual wages also differ significantly by firm ownership. FDIEs pay the most (19.6 thousand yuan), followed by HMTEs (15.4 thousand yuan), SOEs (14.1 thousand yuan) and then Collectives (11.9 thousand yuan and PDEs (11.8 thousand yuan). For average annual allowances per worker, SOEs are most generous at 6.2 thousand yuan, followed by FDIEs (4.8 thousand yuan), Collectives and HMTEs (2.7 thousand yuan) and PDEs (2.4 thousand yuan). Table 1 also confirms that regular exporters pay the highest wages and the highest allowances compared with pure exporters and non-exporters.
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The bottom rows of Table 1 show the breakdown of capital shares by source for the average firm. Note that these shares do not sum up to 100 because they do not include corporate capital, which is defined as capital from other enterprises. 19 The sources of corporate capital are tallied when firms are classified into firm types, but are not reported in the dataset. 20 The presence of corporate capital that cannot be allocated among our five firm types presents a problem when we use reported capital shares to represent different firm ownership. We deal with this issue by excluding observations where corporate capital represents majority firm ownership or where the specified firm type does not match the largest capital share reported for a firm.
The last two columns in Table 1 focus on the GE and Textiles industries at the national level. For most variables, the average firms in these two industries straddle the average firm across all industries. The average firm in the GE industry is below the national average in terms of employment, export share, likelihood of exporting, and female share of employment, while it is above the national average for share of higher education workers, annual wage and annual allowance per worker. The average Textile industry firm shows the opposite tendencies.
We now focus our attention on GE and Textiles firms located in the targeted YRD region.
This region hosts the majority of the firms and almost half of the total output in our two target industries. The region hosts 10,031 General Equipment firms (52% of the national total), which produce 48% of the industry's output, and 13,824 Textiles firms (61% of the national total) producing 53% of the total Textile Industry output. Tables 2 and 3 yuan. An unexpected outcome is that the average wage rankings are almost a complete reversal of the productivities rankings in the Textiles Industry. SOEs pay the most (15.9 thousand yuan), followed by FDIEs (15.2 thousand yuan), HMTEs (14.3 thousand yuan), PDEs (11.8 thousand yuan) and Collectives (11.5 thousand yuan).
Besides ownership types, another potential difference across firms is their participation, or lack thereof, in international trade. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, we divide each industries' firms into exporters, pure exporters and non-exporters to see whether our data match some of the general predictions of heterogeneous firms models and the Defever and Riano (2012) model.
With 30% of firms in the GE industry classified as exporters or pure exporters, as shown in Table 2 , the disaggregation by exporter status allows us to confirm some well-known predictions of heterogeneous firms model: 1) both types of exporters are larger in terms of workforce size and total output than non-exporters; 2) both types of exporters are more productive than nonexporters; and 3) both types of exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters. Regular exporters also employ more high-skilled labor than non-exporters (13.6% vs. 9.7%), but pure exporters employ less high-skilled labor (9.2%) than non-exporters, suggesting differences between the two types of exporters. The productivity comparison for the GE Industry with pure exporters more productive than non-exporters but less productive than regular exporters matches the findings of Defever and Riano (2012) . Table 3 shows the same disaggregation for the Textiles Industry into exporters, pure exporters and non-exporters. For this industry, all of the heterogeneous firms' model predictions mentioned above are confirmed for regular exporters, but only half are confirmed for pure exporters. Regular exporters on average are larger, more productive, pay higher wages and employ more skilled labor than non-exporters. Pure exporters, however, are less productive and employ slightly less skilled labor than non-exporters.
The descriptive statistics support many of the heterogeneous firms' model's predictions regarding regular exporters versus non-exporters at the industry level, but the distinction between regular and pure exporters, and ownership effects also seem to differentiate firms. To further pursue the determinants of firm-level wages along both the exporter dimension and the ownership dimension, we turn next to regression analysis.
Regression Results
Tables 4 and 5 show our wage regression results for equation (1) for the GE and Textiles Industries, respectively. The benchmark equation includes only our control variables, along with city and sector dummies. Then we add exporter status or firm type dummy variables to examine their impacts on our wage regressions separately, and then we include them together. The benchmark equation results show that our control variables are highly significant and of the expected signs for both industries, except for an insignificant coefficient on the share of high school educated workers in the Textiles Industry. 21 Aside from that exception, capital-intensity, size and workforce education are all positively associated with firms' average wages, while the female share of the workforce is negatively related to wages. Adding exporter and pure exporter dummies to our regressions produces positive, significant and quantitatively similar coefficients for both exporter types in both industries. This suggests that even after controlling for differences in capital-intensity, size, workforce quality, and gender, along with differences in specific sector and location, exporters and pure exporters pay more than non-exporters within the same industry and geographic region. The exporter wage premium over non-exporters is slightly larger than the pure exporter wage premium in the GE Industry at 9.6% and 7.0%, respectively.
In the Textiles Industry, we find the opposite ranking with pure exporters paying 10.3% more while regular exporters pay 8.0% more that non-exporters.
22 21 We believe that finding is due to the labor-intensive nature of the Textiles Industry, in which a high school education may not lead to additional labor productivity, and therefore higher wages, relative to a middle school education. 22 Given the similarity in sizes of the exporter and pure exporter wage premiums in each industry, we test the hypothesis that Exporter=PureExporter in each industry. Using p-values, this hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level in the Textiles Industry, but is not rejected even at the 10% level in the GE Industry.
We identify the firm type wage premiums next, while ignoring any differences along the exporter dimension. The estimated wage premiums for both types of foreign firms relative to PDEs are significant and positive in both industries, but the results for SOEs and Collectives are mixed. In the GE Industry, FDIEs pay the highest wage premium at 36.7%, followed by SOEs at 20.7%, and then HMTEs at 18.8%, while Collectives do not produce a significant wage premium relative to PDEs. In the Textiles Industry, the wage premiums by firm type are smaller and only the foreign firms report significant and positive wage premiums. FDIEs again come out on top at 17.3% and HMTEs follow with a 12.8% wage premium over PDEs. SOEs do not produce a significant wage premium, but Collectives are estimated to pay 3.9% less than PDEs, after controlling for other firm differences.
Our next regressions include both exporter status and firm type variables simultaneously.
We measure firm ownership in two different ways: 1) in a discrete manner using a dummy variable based on a firm's legal classification, and 2) as a continuous variable using the capital shares from each different source. 23 The results are shown in the 4 th and 5 th results columns in Tables 4 and 5 . The results using firm type dummies for the GE industry show that the exporter coefficient remains highly significant and positive but is smaller with the addition of the firm type dummies. After controlling for firm type differences, exporters pay 4.6% more than nonexporters. Another change in results is that the pure exporter coefficient loses significance once we control for firm type effects. This implies that pure exporters pay wages similar to nonexporters once firm type effects are taken into account. The estimated wage premiums associated with firm type do not change much at all with the addition of the exporter and pure exporter dummy variables. FDIEs produce a 35.6% wage premium, followed by SOEs at 20.4%, 23 Some observations are dropped for the capital share regressions if the corporate capital share exceeded 50% or if the legal classification of a firm did not match the highest reported capital share, as described previously.
and then HMTEs at 18.1%. These results are robust to changing the specification to capital shares. Using capital shares, however, we find that SOE capital produces the largest wage premium, followed by FDIE capital and then HMTE capital. A 10 percentage point increase in the SOE capital share corresponds with 6% increase in wages, versus 4% increase for FDIEs and 2% increase for HMTEs. The change in ranking may be due to the change in sample size required to produce our capital share results.
Controlling for exporter status and firm type simultaneously does not change the pattern of significant coefficients at all in the Textiles Industry, which differs from our result for pure exporters in the GE industry. After controlling for firm type, exporters pay 6.2% more and pure exporters pay 7.5% more than non-exporters in Textiles. Once we control for exporter status, FDIEs pay a 15.3% wage premium over PDEs, followed by HMTEs at 11.5%. SOEs do not produce a significant wage coefficient while Collectives pay 3.6% less than PDEs. These results also are robust to changing the specification to capital shares rather than firm type dummy variables. For both industries, the results of these four wage regressions that include exporter status and/or firm type indicate a wider range of wage premiums associated with firms' ownership than with their exporter status. This implies that firm ownership is the stronger determinant of wage inequality across firms. As a robustness test of this result, we repeat these regressions using all firms in the YRD (but with 2-digit industry dummies rather than 4-digit industry dummies). With over 94,000 observations, these results show wage premiums that follow a pattern similar to those found in Tables 4 and 5 . The following wage premiums are found: FDIE (26.0%), SOE (19.4%), HMTE (14.6%), PureExporter (5.8%), Exporter (5.5%), and Collective (-1.1%).
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24 The YRD "all industry" results are included in an appendix, available upon request from the authors.
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The last two columns of Tables 4 and 5 allow for interactions between the exporter variables and the firm ownership variables. The results indicate some asymmetric wage effects of firm type by exporter status. We focus our attention on the results that are significant across both specifications for firm ownership. For the GE Industry, the insignificant Exporter coefficient and significant PureExporter coefficient imply that among PDEs, only pure exporting produces a wage premium over non-exporting, at 4.2%. The results for the firm type variables alone show significant and large wage premiums for SOEs, HMTEs and FDIEs. These wage premiums show the effect of firm type among non-exporters. The largest wage premium of 28.2% reflects the wage advantage of FDIE non-exporters over PDE non-exporters, after controlling for other firm-level differences. Examining the interacted terms with Exporter, both the Exporter*SOE and Exporter*FDIE terms produce highly significant and positive coefficients across both specifications. These results imply that exporting activities strengthen the wage advantages of SOEs and FDIEs relative to PDEs. For the pure exporter interactive effects, we find negative and significant terms for PureExporter*HMTE and PureExporter*FDIE, indicating that pure exporting decreases the foreign firms' wage premiums relative to PDEs. Since the negative interactive coefficients are smaller than the corresponding firm type coefficients for non-exporters in the firm type regression, we conclude that pure exporting is associated with lower wages than non-exporting among HMTE and FDIE firms, but the foreign-invested pure exporters still pay higher wages than PDE pure exporting firms.
The results in Table 5 for the interaction term regressions for the Textile Industry show some qualitative similarities to those presented above for the GE Industry, but we also notice a few differences. Among Textile PDEs, pure exporting again produces a wage premium, but we also find a significant wage premium from regular exporting, which we did not find in the GE 21 results. Pure Exporting produces a slightly stronger wage premium (8.0%) than Exporting (5.2%) among PDEs in Textiles. The firm type dummies again show HMTEs and FDIEs with highly significant and large positive wage premiums for their non-exporting firms relative to non-exporting PDEs, at 13.3% and 10.6% respectively. However, the coefficient on SOE is barely significant in one specification and insignificant in the other, while Collective nonexporters produce a negative wage premium of 4.8%. Among the interaction terms with Exporter, we find consistently significant coefficients only for Exporter*FDIE, implying an additional 6.6% wage premium. For the interaction terms involving PureExporter, the interaction with HMTEs produces a consistent significant effect that is negative, while the interaction with FDIEs is significant and positive. These results imply that FDIE exporters pay a total wage premium of 17.9% relative to PDE exporters, 25 and FDIE pure exporters pay a 15.7%
wage premium over PDE pure exporters while HMTE pure exporters pay only 7.1% more than PDE pure exporters. Across both industries, two consistent interactions were identifiedexporting strengthens the wage advantage of FDI ownership, while pure exporting weakens the wage advantage of HMT ownership relative to private domestic ownership. In addition, we find that even among non-exporting firms, SOEs, HMTEs and FDIEs pay significant wage premiums relative to PDEs, with premiums ranging from 14-28% in the GE Industry, and 9-13% in the Textiles Industry.
Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that firm-level wage differences are significantly influenced by both firm ownership and exporter status, and by the interaction between the two. So far, these effects have been measured by shifts in the wage regression intercept. A firm's ownership type can affect the intercept of our regression directly as shown by 22 the significant firm type dummies, or indirectly through the asymmetric exporter and pure exporter wage premiums as shown by the significant interactions between firm type and exporter status. Firm ownership also could interact with control variables to impact the slopes of our wage regression with respective to our control variables.
Our next results consider differences across firm types in the responsiveness of wages to our control variables. We expand regression equation (1) to include interactions between firm type and control variables. Since the results in Tables 4 and 5 showed asymmetric wage effects of firm type by exporter status, 26 we group firms by their exporter status and center our control variables around the mean for PDE firms of that exporter status. Table 6 shows these results, with our four educational attainment variables collapsed into one "higher education" variable (i.e., some college education and above) due to space constraints. 27 The differences in coefficient size and significance, and in the fit of our wage regression across the Exporter, Pure
Exporter and Non-Exporter dimension are quite apparent in these results. We are best able to explain firm-level wages of exporters in both industries, presumably because these firms are the most market-oriented compared with pure exporters and non-exporters.
We focus our attention on the interaction coefficients to see how each firm type differs from the average PDE in terms of the relationship between control variables and wages. For the GE industry, wages are significantly more sensitive to capital-intensity in FDIEs relative to PDEs at all exporter statuses. Increasing capital-per-labor by 1% produces an extra 8.1% wage increase in an FDIE exporter or pure exporter relative to the wage increase at an average PDE 26 The significance of the coefficients indicates whether exporters and pure exporters differ significantly from non-exporters in their wage effects. We also test the hypothesis that exporters and pure exporters have identical wage effects and find that we can reject that hypothesis for 4 out of 5 firm types in GE and 3 out of 5 firm types in Textiles, which provides support for grouping firms by exporter status in the next table.
27 Collectives were included in these regressions, but we suppress those results since they produced very few significant coefficients.
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exporter or pure exporter, respectively. For an FDIE non-exporter, a similar increase in capitalintensity is associated with a 6.8% added wage increase relative to the average PDE nonexporter. For other firm types in the GE industry, only SOE exporters show significant interaction effects with capital-intensity. A 1% increase in capital-intensity is associated with a 15.7% added wage increase in SOE exporters relative to the average PDE exporters. In the Textiles Industry, only HMTE exporters produce a significant coefficient for the capital-intensity interaction, and the coefficient is relatively small, at 2.3%. Taken together these results suggest that asymmetric wage effects from capital-intensity are most likely to be found among FDIEs in the GE industry, regardless of their exporter status, but the largest added wage effect from capital-intensity was estimated for SOE exporters in the GE Industry.
For the interactions with firm size, in the GE industry non-exporters produce the most significant interaction terms but the signs differ. SOE non-exporters show stronger wage sensitivity to firm size than an average PDE non-exporter, but HMTE non-exporters show weaker wage sensitivity from firm size. In fact, the HMTE-interacted coefficient with firm size is so large in absolute value that firm size has a negative total estimated effect on wages for HMTE non-exporters. In the Textiles Industry, FDIE exporters also produce a significant negative interaction coefficient with firm size, and the total estimated effect on wages is negative but relatively small.
FDIE firms produce the most significant interaction coefficients with the share of higher educated workers employed in both industries. For every industry-and-exporter-status grouping except GE pure exporters, FDIEs show stronger wage sensitivity to workforce education, with coefficients ranging from 0.5% to 1.2%. SOE and HMTE non-exporters in both industries also 24 produce significant interaction coefficients within this range. The largest significant interaction coefficient with workforce education is estimated for SOE exporters in Textiles at 1.7%.
The gender wage gap effect appears for PDE exporters and non-exporters in both industries, but it is not significant for wage differentials among pure exporters. The interaction coefficients show an even stronger gender wage gap effect for SOE pure exporters in Textiles, SOE non-exporters in both industries, HMTE exporters in both industries and pure exporters in the GE Industry, and for FDIE pure exporters in GE and exporters in Textiles. The added negative impact on wages from a larger share of female workers is strongest for SOE pure exporters and non-exporters in the Textiles Industry. Overall, the results of interacting our control variables with firm type dummies confirm that firm type matters in determining the strength and occasionally even the direction of the relationship between control variables and firm wages.
Conclusions
Our results focusing on two major industries located in the Yangtze River Delta provide support for a heterogeneous firms' model approach to examining the determinants of wage inequality across firms. Regular exporters are larger, more productive, and they employ higher skilled workers and pay higher wages than non-exporters in both industries. Pure exporters are larger and pay higher wages than non-exporters in both industries, and they are more productive in the GE Industry, but they fail to satisfy the heterogeneous firms' model predictions along other dimensions (i.e., pure exporters employ less high-skilled labor than non-exporters in both industries and they are less productive than non-exporters in the Textiles Industry). We find that even after controlling for differences in sector, location, capital-intensity, firm size, workforce gender and quality, exporters and pure exporters pay more than non-exporters.
Wage premiums associated with exporter status have not been taken into account previously in the literature that seeks to identify foreign ownership wage premiums. Since the majority of FDIE and HMTE firms are exporters while the majority of domestic firms are nonexporters, we sought to disentangle the exporter effect from the firm-ownership effect in determining firm wages. After controlling for sector, location, capital-intensity, size, workforce characteristics and exporter status, FDIEs pay the highest wages, with a wage premium of 35.6%
in GE and 15.3% in Textiles. SOEs produce the second-largest wage premium in the GE Industry, at 20.4%, but they fail to produce a significant wage premium in the Textiles Industry.
HMTEs produce an 18.1% wage premium in the GE Industry, and they produce the secondhighest wage premium in Textiles at 11.5%. These wage premiums are smaller than Chen, Ge and Lai (2011) report using all industries and OLS regression, but they do not control for firms' exporter status in finding firm ownership wage premiums of 39.1% for FDIEs, 19.2% for HMTEs, and 18.9% for SOEs relative to PDEs. 28 They also find Collectives pay 1.4% less than PDEs, while we find that Collectives do not produce a significant wage differential in the GE Industry but they pay 3.7% less than PDEs in Textiles. By separating the exporter effects from the firm ownership effects on wages, we believe our wage premiums better reflect the true size of each effect.
Our estimated wage premiums associated with firm type, after controlling for exporter status, show larger differentials than those associated with exporter status, after controlling for firm type. The exporter wage premiums are only 4.6% and 6.2% in GE and Textiles, respectively, while the pure exporter wage premium is insignificant in GE and 7.5% in Textiles.
Based on these results and others available in an appendix, we conclude that firm ownership is a 26 stronger determinant than exporter status for inter-firm wage inequality, at least for firms in the YRD region.
We also find evidence that firm ownership wage premiums differ by the exporter status of firms. Across both industries, exporting enhances the wage premiums from FDI ownership, while pure exporting weakens the wage premiums from HMT ownership relative to private domestic ownership. Among non-exporters, we find consistent evidence of large wage premiums associated with firm type, ranging from 14-28% in the GE Industry and from 9-13% in the Textiles Industry. In seeking to understand the wage premiums associated with firm type and exporter status, we explored asymmetries in the effects of our other wage determinants-capitalintensity, firm size, and workforce education and gender. These results confirm that firm type matters in determining the strength of the relationship between control variables and firm wages.
Due to data limitations, we are unable to examine directly changes in intra-sectoral wage 201 Notes: ***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level; numbers in paren-theses are standard errors; numbers in brackets are exp(coefficient)-1; some standard errors suppressed due to page constraint. 
